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Abstract
Recent literature has presented arguments linking income inequality on
the financial crash of 2007 - 2009. One proposed channel is expected to work
through bank credit. We analyze the relationship between income inequality
and bank credit in panel cointegration framework, and find that they have a
long-run dependency relationship. Results show that income inequality has
contributed to the increase of bank credit in developed economies after the
Second World War.
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1 Introduction
Historically the most prominent factor behind financial crises has been the ab-
normal growth of bank credit or leverage (Gorton 2012; Schularik and Taylor
2012). After the financial crisis of 2007-2009, the relation between income in-
equality and financial crises has also become under scrutiny. Rajan (2010) argues
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that rising inequality in developed economies caused redistribution in the form
of subsidized housing finance, which led to a boom in mortgages and later to a
crash with known consequences. Iacoviello (2008) shows that income inequal-
ity was the main driver of increasing household debt in the United States during
the 1980s and 1990s using a simulated theoretical model. Kumhof and Rancière
(2010) argue in their theoretical model that there is a a long-run relationship be-
tween inequality and credit, where higher inequality leads to higher level of bank
loans. Inequality raises the indebtedness of middle-income and poor households
as a result of consumption smoothing. This article shows that there is a long-run
steady-state relationship between income inequality and bank loans in developed
economies, where inequality leads to higher levels of bank credit.
In a recent article, Bordo and Meissner estimate the effect of change in in-
come inequality on the growth of bank loans and find "very little evidence linking
credit booms and financial crises to rising inequality" (Bordo and Meissner 2012,
p. 2148). Atkinson and Morelli (2011) find that there seems to be only an ambigu-
ous causal relation of changes in income inequality on economic crises. Atkin-
son and Morelli (2011, p. 48) conclude that "we have not investigated whether
inequality level was relatively higher before identified macroeconomic shocks.
Therefore, the level hypothesis cannot be ruled out at this stage."
Atkinson and Morelli (2011) refer to the hypothesis, where banks take higher
risks in extent to higher income inequality through securitization. But, the level
of income inequality also plays a role in the model by Kumhof and Rancière
(2010). In the model investors (the top 5% of income earners) own the whole
stock of physical capital and derive their income from the physical capital and
from interest on loans to workers. The bargaining power between investors and
workers determines the distribution of income in the economy. In this setup, de-
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crease in the bargaining power of workers leads to higher income inequality by
lowering the wages of workers, which induces higher lending from investors as
they have surplus funds to invest. The more the real income of the workers drops,
the more they have to borrow to maintain their level of consumption. This cre-
ates a trending relation between income inequality and bank credit, where higher
income income inequality leads to higher levels of credit. However, income in-
equality tends to grow very rapidly in the face of the decreasing bargaining power
of workers, whereas leverage, or the debt-to-real income ratio of workers tends
to grow more steadily. The process of leveraging is gradual because borrowing
matches the decreasing real income of workers as they do not increase their con-
sumption, but just try to maintain their original level consumption. That is why
short-run changes in income inequality may not have an effect on the growth of
bank credit. What matters for bank credit is the long-run, trending relationship
between credit and income inequality.1
The analysis of this possible long-run relationship is complicated by the fact
that bank loans tend to grow over time, whereas the generally used measures of
income inequality, like the top 1% income share, are bounded from above. This
creates a problem, because it is not possible for something that is not trending
to have a long-run equilibrium relation with something that is upward trending,
in the first two moments at least. There are two ways around this problem: the
trending series can be detrended or it can be bounded using some suitable trans-
formation. Detrending of the series is problematic, because it will remove the very
thing under interest, that is, the trend. Fortunately, there is a natural candidate by
which the series can be transformed. The top 1% income share measures the share
of national income concentrated on the hands of the highest percentile of income
1See Perugini et al. (2013) for a thorough discussion about the theoretical linkages between
income inequality and financial stability.
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earners. As GDP is, in practice, the national income of a country, the share can
be presented as income of the top 1%GDP . Therefore, it would be natural to convert bank
loans the same way, i.e., bank loansGDP . This transformation would make the mea-
sures comparable, as both would be expressed as a percentage of total income,
or GDP, without removing the possible long-run relationship that may exist be-
tween inequality and credit. As explained above, household leverage is modeled
as workers debt-to-income ratio in the theoretical model by Kumhof and Rancière
(2010). Thus, credit-to-GDP ratio is also a more accurate statistical approxima-
tion of the measure of leverage used by Kumhof and Ranciére than the level or the
first difference of bank credit.
In this article, we test and estimate the relationship of income inequality and
credit as ratios to real GDP. We use data on the income share of top 1% income
earners and bank loans on eight developed economies. Results indicate that both
the top 1% income share and the share of credit are driven by stochastic trends.
The two series are also found to be cointegrated of order one implying that they
have a long-run equilibrium relation. The long-run elasticity of the share of bank
loans with respect to income inequality is estimated with panel DSUR and it is
found to be positive. Top 1% income share is also found to predict the share of
credit, but not the other way around, using a Granger non-causality test.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the data and
gives the results of panel unit root tests. Results of estimations, cointegration and
Granger non causality tests are reported in section 3, and section 4 concludes.
2 Data and unit root tests
The annual data on bank loans include end-of-year amount of lending by domestic
banks to domestic households and nonfinancial corporations in domestic currency
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excluding lending within the financial system (Schularik and Taylor 2012). Banks
are defined as monetary institutions and they include savings banks, postal banks,
credit unions, mortgage associations, and building associations. The data on bank
loans comes from the dataset of Schularik and Taylor (2012).
We use the top 1% income share of the population to proxy the income in-
equality. Leigh (2007) has demonstrated that the top 1% income share series have
a high correlation with other measures of income inequality, like the Gini index,
which makes the series a comparable measure of income inequality. The data on
top income share is obtained from the World Top Income Database (Atkinson et
al. 2011). In addition to income concentration we use several macroeconomic
aggregates attributed as factors behind credit growth as control variables. These
include real GDP per capita, investments as a share of GDP, short-term interest
rates, and broad money (M2) as a share of GDP (Bordo and Meissner 2012; Borio
and White 2003; Mendoza and Terrone 2008). The data on investment as a share
of GDP, short-term interest rates, and broad money (M2) as a share of GDP is
obtained from the dataset of Schularik and Taylor (2012). The data on real GDP
is taken from the Maddison dataset of the Groningen Growth and Development
Centre.
Leverage is modeled as a debt to real income ratio in the theoretical model
by Kumhof and Rancière (2010). Thus, to test the hypotheses by Kumhof and
Ranciere, we use bank loans to real GDP as our dependent variable. Descriptive
statistics of the data are presented in Appendix I.
Due to limitations of the data on top 1% income share, we are able to construct
a balanced panel on eight countries.2 The baseline dataset spans from 1959 to
2008, whereas the dataset including short-term interest rate spans from 1972 to
2Countries included in the panel are: Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the
United Kingdom and the United States.
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2008. Figure 1 presents the time series of the share of credit to real GDP and the
mean of the top 1% income share in our data. Figure shows a roughly similar
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Figure 1. Shares of bank loans to real GDP and the top 1% income share in eight developed
economies. Sources: Atkinson et al. (2011); Schularik and Taylor (2012).
pattern in all eight countries. During the period of 1959-1980 the share of income
of the top 1% decreased, but at the same time the share of bank loans increased,
although only marginally. During that period income inequality decreased the
most in Sweden and in France. After 1980 the share of income earned by the
top 1% and the share of bank loans to real GDP grew at a very similar pace in
all countries. This period after 1980 gives some evidence in favor of the level
hypothesis stating that bank credit is increased with inequality. During this period
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bank loans diminished only in Japan, which suffered from a decade long recession
that began in 1991. Because of the country related heterogeneity, the best way
to analyze the possible relationship between the two variables is to test are the
different trend processes driven by the same factor(s).
The data on bank loans is extremely heterogeneous, as described by Schu-
larik and Taylor (2012). Credit, money and banking institutions differ profoundly
across countries and in some cases historical data on credit covers only commer-
cial banks. As Schularik and Taylor, we tackle the issue of heterogeneity by using
country-related constants. There are few yearly observations missing from the top
1% income share data, which we replace by averages of the values preceding and
following the missing observation.
We start by testing the time series properties of the data. As the time series
extent of the data (50 annual observations) is too short for a country related time
series testing, we use two sets of panel unit root tests to test for the possible
stochastic trends. The first two are the so called first-generation tests, by Im et al.
(2003) (IPS) and the Fisher type ADF test by Maddala and Wu (1999). These tests
assume that there is no cross-sectional correlation between the units of the panel.
The second generation panel unit root tests by Pesaran (2007) and Phillips and Sul
(2003) allow for cross-sectional correlation within the panel. In all tests the null
hypothesis is that the series is trend-stationary. A more detailed introduction on
the used tests is provided in the Appendix II. Table 1 presents the results of panel
unit root tests for the six included variables.
According to results presented in table 1, all panel unit root tests find the share
of credit to real GDP to be an unit root process, i.e., tests cannot reject the null
hypothesis of an unit root. Three out of four tests find the top 1% income share
and the share of broad money to GDP to be unit root processes. Two out of the
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Table 1: Panel unit root tests
variable IPS ADF PS Pesaran
credit/RGDP 2.973 7.157 5.908 2.135
(0.998) (0.970) (0.969) (0.984)
top 1% 3.075 3.631 8.470 -3.891
(0.999) (0.997) (0.863) (<.001)
investments/GDP -3.077 36.646 14.978 -1.792
(0.001) (0.002) (0.380) (0.037)
M2/GDP 3.543 8.127 25.954 -0.629
(0.999) (0.945) (0.026) (0.265)
ln(real GDP per capita) -1.947 27.268 11.772 -0.833
(0.0258) (0.0386) (0.625) (0.203)
short term interest rate* -2.880 34.090 40.484 -.866
(0.002) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002)
In the unit root tests, the tested model is: 4yit = ρiyi,t−1 + δi + ηit+ θt + it, and H0 : ρ = 0. The
p-values of the test statistics are presented in parentheses. All other test are done with the eight
country panel ranging from 1959 to 2008, except tests for short term interest rates are done with a
panel with yearly observations from 1972 to 2008.
four tests find the real GDP per capita to be an unit root process and one out of
the four tests find the share of investments to GDP to be an unit root process.
According to all tests, the short-term interest rate is a trend-stationary process.3
3 Cointegration test and estimations
3.1 Panel cointegration testing
According to unit root tests presented in table 1, stochastic trends would drive the
time series of the top 1% income share and the share of credit to real GDP. Next we
test if the stochastic trends are linear combinations of one and another, that is, we
test are the series cointegrated. To this end, we use two panel cointegration tests
3According to all second generation panel unit root tests, the first differences of log of credit
to real GDP, top 1% income share, investments to GDP, money to GDP and GDP per capita are
trend-stationary. Results are available upon request.
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proposed by Pedroni (2004) and by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2011) (from
now on BC). The biggest difference between these tests is that while Pedroni’s
test assumes uncorrelated residual structure, BC’s test allows for cross-sectional
correlation through common factors and it also controls for possible structural
breaks in the cointegration relation. Appendix III gives more detailed description
of the used tests.
The model for testing for cointegration between inequality and credit is:
credit/RGDPit = αi +γitop1%it + it, (1)
where the level of bank loans are explained by the level of inequality, and (1,−γi)
is the country-specific cointegration vector between bank loans and the top 1%
income share. Under the null hypothesis γi = 1 ∀ i implying that variables are not
cointegrated. We include individual constants due to heterogeneity of the data on
bank loans discussed in the previous section. Results of panel cointegration tests
based on the model (1) are presented in table 2.4 15 out of the 19 test statistics
in table 2 find that the series of top 1% income share and credit to real GDP are
cointegrated of order one at the 5% significance level. Results presented in the last
four rows give some indication that deterministic trends may need to be incorpo-
rated in the estimated model. Still, the overall conclusions from cointegration tests
is clear: the top 1% income share and credit to real GDP seem to be cointegrated
indicating that the two series have a long-run steady-state relation.
3.2 Estimations
First differencing of cointegrated variables removes stochastic trends and elimi-
nates the long-run dependency between the variables. What remains is a short-run
4The Pedroni’s test was conducted with Eviews 6 and B&C’s test was done with Gauss. We
are grateful to Carrion-i-Silvestre for providing the program code.
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Table 2: Panel cointegration test statistics for credit/RGDP and top 1% income
share
Pedroni tests
Within-dimension Constants Constants
panel v-statistic -0.898 -1.392
(0.267) (0.1512)
panel ρ-statistic 2.112 2.444
(0.043) (0.020)
panel PP-statistic 3.606 3.604
(<.001) (<.001)
panel ADF-statistic 4.0827 3.529
(0.001) (<.001)
Between-dimension Constants
group ρ-statistic 3.059
(0.004)
group PP-statistic 4.483
(<.001)
group ADF-statistic 4.549
(<.001)
BC tests
Constants Trends
ZtˆNT (λˆ) 2.900 -2.185
(0.998) (0.015)
ZρˆNT (λˆ) 1.616 -5.806
(0.947) (<.001)
Constants, ci. vector shift Trends, ci. vector shift
ZtˆNT (λˆ) -3.164 -1.896
(<.001) (0.029)
ZρˆNT (λˆ) -11.88 -6.929
(<.001) (<.001)
The null hypothesis is that the variables are not cointegrated. In the test by Pedroni, lag length
were determined with the Akaike information criterion. Constants states that individual constants
were used in the test, and trends that individual constants and trends were used in the test. Tests
with level and cointegration vector shifts allow for structural breaks to occur in the country-specific
cointegration relations.
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relation, which may or may not exist. To test for this, we first estimate a model
where the variables are first differenced. More precisely, we estimate a model:
∆credit/RGDPit = αi +β1∆topi,t−1 +β2∆ln(RGDP)i,t−1 (2)
+β3∆investments/GDPi,t−1 ++β4∆M2/GDPi,t−1 +β5∆stiri,t−1 +uit,
where αi are individual constants and uit is the idiosyncratic error term. Explana-
tory variables are lagged with one period to control for the possible endogeneity
of regressors. Results reported in table 3 indicate that income inequality would
Table 3: Regression results using first differenced variables
Dependent variable: ∆(credit/RGDP)
FE-OLS FE-OLS
∆top 1t−1 -0.0004 -0.0019
(0.0010) (0.0029)
∆ln(real GDP per capita)t−1 -0.0069 0.1611
(0.0049) (0.1105)
∆investments/GDPt−1 0.0419* 0.3944
(0.0165) (0.2479)
∆M2/GDP t−1 0.0077 0.0255
(0.0060) (0.0253)
∆short term interest ratet−1 - 0.0799
(0.1332)
countries 8 8
years 1960-2008 1972-2008
observations 384 280
Estimations are done with country fixed-effects and White’s heteroskedasticity-consistent
standard errors are presented in parentheses.
not have a statistically significant short-run effect on credit. In the estimation
presented in the last column, none of the parameter estimates of the explanatory
variables is statistically significant at the 5% level.
The picture somewhat changes, when the levels of credit to real GDP and top
1% income share are used. In this case, we use panel DSUR (dynamic seemingly
11
unrelated regressions) estimator by Mark et al. (2005) to estimate the cointegra-
tion coefficient of top 1% income share using a model:
credit/RGDPit = αi +γ′top1it +βpXit + θt +uit, (3)
where αi are individual constant, θt is the common time effect, (1,−γ′) is the coin-
tegrating vector between bank loans and top 1% income share, Xit is the matrix
of additional explanatory variables, and uit is the idiosyncratic error. As the panel
DSUR does not allow for cointegration between explanatory variables, all the
other explanatory variables, besides top 1% income and short term interest rates,
are first-differenced.5 The panel DSUR estimator by Mark et al. (2005) controls
for the possible endogeneity or the reverse causality of explanatory variables by
including the leads and lags of the first differences of the explanatory variables in
the estimated equation. Panel DSUR also allows for cross-sectional dependence.6
More information about the panel DSUR can be found in Appendix IV.
Table 4 presents the results of panel DSUR estimations on equation (3) using
the dataset spanning from 1959 to 2008.7 First differences of the GDP per capita
and shares of M2 and investment to GDP are included as additional explanatory
variables.
According to the results presented in table 4, the cointegration coefficient of
top 1% income share is positive and highly statistically significant.8 The value
of the cointegrating coefficient varies from around 0.12 to around 0.35. From the
control variables GDP per capita growth and change in the level of money have
5There is no need to take the first difference of the short term interest rate, as all the panel unit
root tests presented in table 1 found the series to be trend-stationary.
6In the reported panel DSUR estimates a long-run covariance matrix is used, which actually
makes panel DSUR more efficient when cross-sections are dependent.
7DSUR estimations were done with Gauss. We are grateful to Donggyu Sul for providing the
program code in his homepage.
8We also estimated a model including deterministic trends, but the main results did not change.
Results are available upon request.
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Table 4: DSUR estimates, 1959-2008
Dependent variable: credit/RGDP
top 1% 0.281*** 0.117*** 0.348***
(0.0219) (0.0182) (0.0048)
∆ln(real GDP per capita) - -0.103 0.226***
(0.0719) (0.0869)
∆investment/GDP - - -0.8614***
(0.1746)
∆money/GDP - - 0.381***
(0.0534)
countries 8 8 8
years 1959-2008 1959-2008 1960-2008
observations 400 400 392
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. All DSUR
estimations include individual constants and common time effects. First, second and third leads
and lags of the first differences are used as instruments for the explanatory variables.
expected positive and statistically significant signs. The coefficient of investments
as a share of GDP has an unexpected negative and statistically significant sign.
However, this may be due to the possible correlation between investments and
interest rate. Higher demand for investments may increase the short term interest
rates, but higher interest rates are likely to diminish the demand for bank loans
and investments. Therefore, the negative effect of interest rates to bank loans may
be reflected to investments.9
Table 5 presents the results of panel DSUR estimations on model 3 using the
dataset spanning from 1972 to 2008.10 In addition to first differences of the GDP
per capita, M2 share to GDP and investment share to GDP, short-term interest rate
9Correlation between short term interest rates and investments as a share of GDP is indeed
positive and highly statistically significant. Results are available upon request.
10This is the period that Schularik and Taylor (2012, p. 1031) describe as a "era of unprecented
leverage and risk" because the level of credit in developed economies surpassed pre-war levels
around 1970 and trended up rapidly after that.
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in levels is included as an explanatory variable.11
Table 5: DSUR estimates, 1972-2008
Dependent variable: credit/RGDP
top 1% 0.212*** 0.0264*** 0.159***
(0.0355) (0.0023) (0.0308)
∆ln(real GDP per capita) - -0.302 0.395
(0.2167) (0.5739)
∆investment/GDP - - -0.6754
(0.3611)
∆money/GDP - - -0.5923*
(0.2355)
short term interest rate - - -0.706***
(0.1527)
countries 8 8 8
years 1972-2008 1972-2008 1972-2008
observations 296 296 296
* = p<.05, ** = p<.01, *** = p<.001. Standard errors are presented in parentheses. All DSUR
estimations include individual constants and common time effects. First leads and lags of the first
differences are used as instruments for the explanatory variables.
According to the results of table 5, the cointegrating coefficient of top 1% in-
come share is positive and highly statistically significant. The first differences of
money share to GDP and the short-term interest rate have statistically significant
negative parameter estimates. The negative effect of short-term interest rate to ra-
tio of bank loans to real GDP is expected, as higher interest rates make borrowing
more expensive. The negative parameter estimate of the share of M2 to GDP, on
the other hand, is likely to result from reverse causality. That is, as bank loans
increase, money held in deposit accounts (etc.) decreases, which will decrease the
broad money in circulation.12
11DSUR estimations were done with Gauss. We are grateful to Donggyu Sul for providing the
program code in his homepage.
12We also estimated a model including deterministic trends, but the main results did not change.
Results are available upon request.
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3.3 Granger causality tests
Roine et al. (2009) have shown that financial development, measured as the share
of bank deposits and stock market capitalization, can have an effect on the income
of the top 1%.13 If the same applies to bank credit, there would be a reverse effect
from credit to income inequality. Panel DSUR estimator by Mark et al. (2005)
controls for this possible endogeneity by including the leads and lags of the ex-
planatory variables to the estimated model. The drawback of this method is that
it is sensitive to the selection of leads and lags. If some or all of the explanatory
variables are endogenous, and if the number of leads and lags has not been suffi-
cient to eliminate the correlation between them and the error term, estimates will
not be asymptotically unbiased.
Testing for this possible bias without strictly exogenous instruments is diffi-
cult. However, Granger non-causality test can be used to assess whether income
inequality helps to forecast the share of credit and vice versa. Although this is
not an actual test for causality, it will show the direction of the flow of statistical
(predictive) information, which can be used to assess whether there are reasons to
suspect a reverse effect or causality running from bank credit to income inequality.
We use the Granger non-causality test by Emirmahmutoglu and Kose (2011)
developed for heterogeneous cointegrated panels. It conducts N separate time
series tests and then calculates Fisher test statistics by Fisher (1932) using the
obtained individual p-values. Cross-sectional correlation is controlled by using
bootstrap method for obtaining the empirical distribution of the Fisher statistic
and associated critical values. Table 6 presents results for Granger non-causality
test between the share of bank credit to RGDP and top 1% income share.14
13See also D’Onofrio and Murro (2013).
14Testing was carried out with Matlab. We are grateful to Furkan Emirmahmutoglu for provid-
ing the program in runmycode.org.
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Table 6: Tests for Granger non causality between credit/RGDP and the top 1%
income share
X Y Fisher statistic 5% 1%
credit/RGDP top 1% 31.07 34.52 44.17
top 1% credit/RGDP 62.54 33.25 42.36
countries 8
years 1959-2008
observations 384
The null hypothesis is that X does not Granger cause Y . Lag lengths were determined using
Akaike information criterion. The empirical distribution and the critical values based on the
Fisher statistics were generated using 10000 bootstrap replications.
According to the results presented in table 6, there is no information on the
share of credit to real GDP series that would help to forecast the top 1% income
share series at the 5% level of significance. However, the information contained
into the top 1% income series does help to forecast the share of credit to RGDP
with 1% level of significance. Results thus indicate that the flow of information
would run from income inequality to bank credit. This diminishes the endogeneity
problem and shows that the estimation results presented in previous section are
not driven by mere statistical correlation. That is, results indicate that income
inequality has a positive long-run effect on the share of credit to real GDP.
4 Conclusion
Schularik and Taylor (2012, p. 1031) have described the period after the Second
World War as the "age of unprecedented risk and leverage". Iacoviello (2008)
shows that income inequality has contributed to the rise of household debt in the
United States during this era. Kumhof and Rancière (2010) argue that there is
a more general, long-run relationship between these variables, where income in-
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equality will lead to increasing leverage in the economy. In this study, we have
tested the existence of such a long-run relationship.
According to our results, there is a long-run steady-state relationship between
income inequality and bank credit in developed economies. The long-run elastic-
ity of credit with respect to income inequality was found to be positive. Income
inequality was also found to have a one-way Granger causality relationship to
bank credit. These results indicate that income inequality has contributed to the
increase of leverage in accordance with the theories by Iacoviello (2008), Kumhof
and Rancière (2010), and Rajan (2010).
Due to the pioneering nature of these findings, directions of future research are
ample. The analysis presented herein concentrated on developed economies, but
the relationship between inequality and credit may differ, for example, in develop-
ing economies. More importantly, future research should include the examination
of the effect of income inequality on the probability of financial crises.15 By dis-
entangling the effect of income inequality and credit as predictors of financial
crises, the channels through which income inequality may increase the probabil-
ity of crises would be made clearer. Future research will also define the possible
need of equalization of the distribution of income as a mean for achieving financial
stability.
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APPENDIX I: Descriptive statistics
Table 7: Descriptive statistics
variable mean std. deviation min. max.
credit/RGDP 1.046 2.675 0.00004 19.578
top 1% 8.165 2.660 3.970 18.333
investments/GDP 0.227 0.0466 0.153 0.363
M2/GDP 0.945 1.944 0.00006 11.039
ln(real GDP per capita) 9.638 0.373 8.176 10.343
short term interest rate* 0.071 0.0379 0.0001 0.183
Countries included are: Australia, Canada, France, Japan, Norway, Sweden, the United Kingdom
and the United States. Data is in annual time series ranging from 1959 to 2008, except data on
short term interest rates which ranges from 1972 to 2008.
APPENDIX II: Panel unit root tests
All the used tests allow for individual unit root processes. That is, they allow
the coefficient of unit root to differ across countries.
The traditional panel unit root tests, are based on the following regression:
4yit = ρiyi,t−1 +ηit+αi + θt + it, (4)
where αi are individual constants, ηit are individual time trends, and θt are the
common time effects. The tests rely on the assumption that E[it js] = 0 ∀ t, s and
i , j, which is required for calculating common time effects. Thus, if the different
series are correlated, the last assumption is violated.
The second generation test is based on the regression
4yit = ρyi,t−1 +ηit+αi +δiθt + it, (5)
where αi are the individual constants, ηit are the individual time trends, and θt is
the common time effect, whose coefficients, δi, are assumed to be non-stochastic,
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measure the impact of the common time effects of series i, and it is assumed to
be normally distributed with mean zero and variance of σ2 and independent of
 js and θs for all i , j and s, t. Cross-sectional dependence is allowed through
the common time effect, which generates the correlation between cross-sectional
units. The matrix δi gives the non-random factor loading coefficients that deter-
mine the extent of the cross-sectional correlation.
The null hypothesis in all tests is that ρi = 0 ∀ i, i.e. that the process in I(1)
nonstationary. The alternative hypotheses are:
H1 : ρi < 0, i = 1,2, ...,N1, ρi = 0, i = N1 + 1,N1 + 2, ...,N. (6)
For consistency of panel unit root tests it is also required that, under the alterna-
tive, the fraction of the individual processes that are stationary is non-zero, for-
mally limN→∞(N1/N) = γ, 0 < γ ≤ 1 (Im et al. 2003).
Appendix III: Panel cointegration tests
Panel cointegration test developed by Banerjee and Carrion-i-Silvestre (2011)
is based on the normalized bias and the pseudo t-ratio test statistics by Pedroni
(2004). The data generating process behind Pedroni’s test statistics is given by:
yit = fi(t) + x′it + eit,
4xit = vit,
eit = ρiei,t−1 + itζit = (it,vit)′,
(7)
where fi(t) includes member specific fixed effects and deterministic trends.
The data generating process is described as a partitioned vector z′it ≡ (yit, xit)
where the true process is generated as zit = zi,t−1 + ζit, ζ′it = (ζ
y
itζ
X
it ) (Pedroni 2004).
1√
T
∑[Tr]
t=1 ζit is assumed to converge to a vector Brownian motion with asymptotic
covariance of Ωi as T −→∞. The individual process is assumed to be i.i.d. so that
E[ζitζ′js] = 0 ∀s, t, i , j.
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Let eˆit denote the estimated residuals of obtained from (7) and Ωˆi the consis-
tent estimator of Ωi. The two test statistics can now be defined as :
Z˜ρˆNT−1 ≡
N∑
i=1
 T∑
t=1
eˆ2i,t−1

−1 T∑
t=1
(eˆi,t−1∆eˆit − λˆi),
Z˜∗tˆNT ≡
N∑
i=1
 T∑
t=1
sˆ∗2i eˆ
∗2
i,t−1

−1/2 T∑
t=1
(eˆ∗i,t−1∆eˆ
∗
it),
where λˆi = 1/T
∑ki
s=1 (1− s/(ki + 1))
∑T
t=s+1 µˆitµˆi,t−s, σ˜
2
NT ≡ 1/N
∑N
i=1 Lˆ
−2
11iσˆ
2
i , sˆ
∗2
i ≡
1/t
∑T
t=1 µˆ
∗2
it , s˜
∗2
NT ≡ 1/N
∑N
i=1 sˆ
∗2
i , Lˆ
2
11i = 1/T
∑T
t=1 ϑˆ
2
it+2/T
∑ki
s=1 (1− s/(k− i+ 1))
∑T
t=s+1 ϑˆi, ϑˆi,t−s.
The residuals µˆit, µˆ∗it and ϑˆit are attained from regressions: eˆit = γˆeˆi,t−1 + µˆit, eˆit =
γˆieˆi,t−1 +
∑K−i
k=1 γˆik∆eˆi,t−k + µˆ
∗
it, ∆yit =
∑M
m=1 bˆmi∆xmi,t = ϑˆit. (Pedroni 1999, 2004)
The statistics pool the between dimension of the panel and they are constructed
by computing the ratio of the corresponding conventional time series statistics
and then by computing the standardized sum of the N time series of the panel.
Pedroni (1999, 2004) shows that under the null of no cointegration the asymptotic
distributions of the two statistics presented above converge to normal distributions
with zero mean and variance of one as N and T sequentially converge to infinity.
Banerjee and Carrion-I-Silvestre (2006) extend the model by Pedroni (2004)
to include common factors:
yi,t = fi(t) + x′i,t +ui,t,
4xi,t = vi,t,
fi(t) = µi +βit
uit = F′tpii + eit,
(8)
where ei,t = ρiei,t + i,t and F′t :s are the common factors which are used to account
for the possible cross-sectional dependence.
APPENDIX IV: Panel DSUR estimator
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The data generation process in Mark et al. (2005) DSUR estimator is of the
form
yit = αi +λit+ θt +β′xit +uit, (9)
4xit = eit (10)
where there are n cointegrating regression each with T observations, (1− β′) is
the cointegration vector between yit and xit, and xit and eit are k× 1 dimensional
vectors. Panel DSUR eliminates the possible endogeneity between explanatory
variables and the dependent variable by assuming that uit is correlated at most
with pi leads and lags of 4xit (Mark et al. 2005). The possible endogeneity can
be controlled by projecting uit onto these pi leads and lags:
uit =
pi∑
s=−pi
δ′i,s4xi,t−s +uit∗ = δ′izit +u∗it. (11)
The projection error u∗it is orthogonal to all leads and lags of 4xit and the estimated
equation becomes:
yit = αi +λit + θt +β′xit +δizit +u∗it, (12)
where δ′izit is a vector of projection dimensions. Panel DSUR estimates a long-
run covariance matrix that is used in estimation of equation (9). This makes
panel DSUR more efficient when cross-sections are dependent. The efficiency
of panel DSUR actually improves as the correlation between cross-sections in-
creases. Asymptotics properties of the estimator are based on T −→ ∞ with N
fixed.
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